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NOT EVERYONE QUALIFIES: A 
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT ANTITRUST LAW 
AND NASCAR’S CHARTER SYSTEM 
TYLER M. HELSEL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Association of Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) has  
become the largest and most influential motor sports league in the world.  
Multi-million-dollar contracts for drivers, sponsors, and equipment make an 
investment into a team a huge financial risk.  As a result, many teams are not 
created or created fairly.  Most recently, Michael Waltrip Racing (MWR), 
which had committed sponsors and employees, was forced to shut down due to 
the economic costs of running a team.1  In response to this, teams formed the 
Race Team Alliance (RTA), a non-union association of team owners with a 
goal of getting more equity in individual teams.2  The RTA, in conjunction 
with NASCAR, formed a chartering system.  In this system, teams acquire a 
nine-year charter from NASCAR, which allows them to compete in the  
thirty-six sanctioned points paying Sprint Cup Races.3  Thirty-six charters 
were granted, leaving only four “open” positions for non-chartered teams to 
compete for each week.4  
The new system’s affect is two-fold.  First, the system guarantees a  
starting position for thirty-six cars, whether their performance is good or not.  
Most teams with charters are long standing, and have substantial sponsorship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Tyler M. Helsel an Associate Attorney at the Kohn Law Firm in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,  
practicing in creditor rights, insurance subrogation, and consumer litigation.  Mr. Helsel graduated 
from Marquette University Law School in 2016 and is a member of the Wisconsin State Bar. 
1. Brant James, Michael Waltrip Racing Bids Goodbye to NASCAR with Homestead Finale, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 21, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nascar/2015/11/21/michael-waltrip-
racing-homestead-final-race-clint-bowyer-martin-truex-jr/76186922/. 
2. See generally Race Team Alliance, http://raceteamalliance.com/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
3. NASCAR hosts two exhibition races per year, which a charter does not automatically qualify a 
team to compete in. 
4. Fast Facts for NASCAR’s Team Owner Charter System, NASCAR (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/2016/2/9/fast-facts-nascar-team-owner-charter-
system.html. 
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and financing.5  Second, the system assures that certain teams are not  
guaranteed a starting position.  For some teams who do not race every  
weekend, this is not a terrible outcome.6  For other teams, lacking a guaranteed 
starting position can be a serious detriment.  For example, Wood Brothers 
Racing has raced in NASCAR since 1950.7  The team ran a full-time schedule 
until 2006.8  The team continued to run in each season, but with a limited 
schedule.9  The team started full-time racing again in 2016.10  NASCAR did 
not award the Wood Brothers a charter when the system was created due to its 
lack of full-time racing in the last three years.11  The Wood Brothers, who has 
continuously raced in NASCAR for over sixty years, is not guaranteed a  
starting position in each race.  The Wood Brothers, like others similarly  
situated teams, face serious issues: sponsors are less willing to sign on with a 
team not guaranteed a starting position (or at the least are only willing to pay a  
lower amount), teams may miss out from revenue from race winnings, and 
drivers may miss out on points in races and the playoffs because a driver is not 
guaranteed a position.  Additionally, teams miss out on the value of a charter.  
Teams like the Wood Brothers may challenge this system under antitrust 
law.  Antitrust law’s purpose is to prevent unfair restraints of trade.  This  
paper will analyze the antitrust implications of NASCAR’s new charter  
system.   First, it will go through the history of NASCAR leading up to the 
implementation of the charter system.  This paper will then analyze antitrust 
law and its application to professional sports, and more specifically NASCAR.  
The final section will examine NASCAR’s charter system and its application 
to antitrust law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. For example, teams such as Hendrick Motor Sports (formed in 1984), Stewart-Hass Racing 
(formed in 2009), and Joe Gibbs Racing (formed in 1992).  See About | Hendrick Motorspots, 
HENDRICK MOTORSPORTS, http://www.hendrickmotorsports.com/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2017); 
see also Stewart Hass Racing, NASCAR (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-
media/articles/team-profiles/stewart-haas-racing.html; see also Joe Gibbs Racing, NASCAR (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/team-profiles/joe-gibbs-racing.html.  
6. For example, teams such as Circle Sport Racing (formed in 2012) and Premium Motorsports.  
See CSTMG, https://www.cstmg.racing (last visited Dec. 14, 2017); see also PREMIUM MOTOR 
SPORTS, http://www.premiummotorsports.net/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
7. History, WOOD BROTHERS RACING, http://woodbrothersracing.com/history-2/ (last visited Dec. 
14, 2017). 
8. Lee Spencer, Unable to Get a Charter, Wood Brothers Leave the RTA, MOTORSPORT (Feb. 12, 
2016), http://www.motorsport.com/nascar-cup/news/unable-to-get-a-charter-wood-brothers-leave-the-
rta-673136/. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. 
11. Id.  
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II. NASCAR, MONEY, AND TIME 
NASCAR’s charter system is a direct result of its past. NASCAR’s past 
saw major changes, whether they were safety innovations, technological  
advances, or corporate involvement.  As a result, money continuously flowed 
into NASCAR from its creation, with everyone wanting a piece.  Recently, 
NASCAR has seen stagnant television ratings and difficult sponsorship  
acquisition due to the 2008 recession.  Therefore, teams who have invested 
millions into race teams required equity for their teams.  In response, 
NASCAR and the teams created the charter system.   
 A.  History 
NASCAR’s history is a collection of rapid expansion and development.  
NASCAR was born in Daytona in 1947.12  Bill France met with other  
promoters atop the Streamline Hotel and created NASCAR.13  NASCAR’s 
fundamental purpose was to centralize stock car racing in the south.14  In 1950, 
Darlington Motor Speedway, the first asphalt speedway, was built.15  Racing 
continued to take place at the beaches in Daytona until 1959, when Daytona 
International Speedway (DIS) was built.16  A 2.5-mile racing coliseum, DIS 
hosted the famed Daytona 500 that same year, and each year since.17  Atlanta 
Motor Speedway and Charlotte Motor Speedway were both built in 1960.18  
The sixties saw massive development in both tracks and revenue.19  
NASCAR’s first major financial step was corporate sponsorship in 1971.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12. About NASCAR, NASCAR, http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/about-
nascar.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
13. Micahel A. Cokley, In the Fast Lane to Big Buck: The Growth of NASCAR, 8 SPORTS LAW J. 
67, 70 (2001). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 70–71. 
17. About NASCAR, supra note 12. 
18. Id. 
19. See id.   
 
([Bill] France [NASCAR’s Chairman and CEO] opened the 2.66-mile Alabama  
International Motor Speedway (now known as Talladega Superspeedway), the largest and 
fastest motorsports oval in the world. New tracks sprang up in Brooklyn, Michigan, (70 
miles Southwest of Detroit), Dover, Delaware, (between Philadelphia and Baltimore) and 
Pocono, Pennsylvania, two hours from New York City.). 
 
20. Id.  NASCAR was known as the Grand National Series prior to corporate sponsorship. 
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The RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company put its name on the newly minted 
NASCAR Winston Cup Series.21  NASCAR became the largest motorsport 
ever spectated in 1976.22  Shortly after, with the 1979 Daytona 500, NASCAR 
became the first live telecast motorsports race in history.23 
NASCAR’s history went through major changes in the 1980s to the  
present. Safety innovations have drastically changed the sport,24 especially  
after the death of Dale Earnhardt.25  NASCAR also created a new playoff 
structure named the “Chase for the Nextel Cup” in 2004, instituted the same 
year as a new title Sponsor.26  NASCAR’s rapid expansion led to money  
flowing in, but also high cost to teams.  With so much money involved, the 
sport has had to rapidly change its structure as a way to succeed. 
NASCAR’s changes, which typically happen rapidly, are due to its general 
structure.  From the beginning, NASCAR has had one man in control.27  This 
is currently CEO Brian France.28  Additionally, NASCAR is a private for  
profit institution, so it does not have to take input from teams or labor unions, 
unique to professional sports.29  This innate ability to make changes without 
burdens from those around the sport has led to rapid expansion and growth and 
serious economic pressures both on NASCAR and the race teams, requiring 
more equity and financial viability in each individual team. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. About NASCAR, supra note 12.  
24. Id. 
25. Dale Earnhardt’s death created multiple waves throughout the sport.  First, Dale Earnhardt was 
a marketing machine both for NASCAR and himself.  See Don Coble, Ten After 3: Dale Earnhardt 
Built an Incredible Marketing Machine, JACKSONVILLE, Feb. 12, 2011, 
http://jacksonville.com/sports/racing/2011-02-12/story/ten-after-3-dale-earnhardt-built-incredible-
marketing-machine.  Second, NASCAR was forced to create many safety innovations.  Part of these 
changes was the Head and Neck Restraint (HANS) device to prevent whiplash and broken necks, new 
and tougher standards for seat belts, and the creation of the Car of tomorrow (CoT), a newer and safer 
car that redistributed the impact exerted during a crash.  See generally Ed Hinton, The Death of Dale 
Earnhardt Accelerated NASCAR’s Safety Revolution, ESPN (Feb. 7, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/racing/nascar/cup/columns/story?id=6116145&columnist=hinton_ed. 
26. About NASCAR, supra note 12.  Sprint and Nextel merged three years later, changing the title 
sponsor to the Sprint Cup Series. 
27. S. Joseph Modric, The Good Ole’ Boys: Antitrust Issues in America’s Largest Spectator Sport, 
1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 161–162 (2003). 
28. Id.  See Cokley, supra note 13, at 72. 
29. Modric, supra note 27, at 163. 
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 B.  Growth 
One thing has been concrete since NASCAR’s creation—money was  
going to be the key.  Bill France, NASCAR’s first president, set out to create 
uniform rules, a points championship, and race winnings.  NASCAR’s first 
champion, Robert “Red” Byron, won a total of $1250 for the title.30  In  
comparison, Kyle Busch, the 2015 Sprint Cup Champion, won $8,393,925.31  
A family business from the start, Bill France handed over NASCAR to his two 
sons upon retirement.32  Bill France Jr. was president of NASCAR until 1998, 
when the first non-France took over the role of president in Mike Helton.33  
Bill France Jr. remained CEO until his son, Brian France, took over in 2003.34 
NASCAR now has tracks across the country, including Las Vegas,  
Kansas, the Sanoma Valley, and upstate New York.35  In the early 2000s 
NASCAR was averaging over 190,000 people per race, making it the  
third-largest spectator sport in the world.36  NASCAR’s television ratings  
continuously rose in the 1990s, and NASCAR signed a $400 million dollar 
deal with FOX, NBC, and TBS.37  NASCAR’s television revenue in 1999 was 
estimated at $100 million alone.38  NASCAR signed a new television contract 
with Fox Sports and NBC in 2014.  The deal was worth a total of $8.2  
billion.39  
With massive expansion come lawsuits.  NASCAR has been sued 
throughout the years for anything ranging from contract disputes to injuries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30. Cokley, supra note 13, at 71. 
31. Id. at 71–72; see Jerry Bonkowski, Kyle Busch Won 2015 Sprint Cup Title, but Harvick, Loga-
no Earned More, NBC SPORTS (Dec. 6, 2015), http://nascar.nbcsports.com/2015/12/06/kyle-busch-
won-sprint-cup-title-but-harvick-earned-more-money-in-2015/. 
32. Bonkowski, supra note 31. 
33. Cokley, supra note 13, at 72.  For example, upon Dale Earnhardt’s death, it was Helton who 
announced his passing.  Due to a recent restructure, Helton is now the Vice Chairman of NASCAR, 
but his role in the company has not seen substantial changes.  See Jeff Owens, Mike Helton Named 
NASCAR Vice Chairman, SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.sportingnews.com/nascar-
news/4635117-mike-helton-named-nascar-vice-chairman-brian-france-nascar-officials-board-of-
directors. 
34. Owens, supra note 33.  
35. See 2017 NASCAR Schedule, NASCAR, https://www.nascar.com/monster-energy-nascar-cup-
series/schedule/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
36. Cokley, supra note 13, at 82. 
37. Id. at 84. Compared to the $3 million-dollar deal signed in 1985.  
38. Id. 
39. Bob Pockrass, How NASCAR Landed a Staggering TV Deal Despite Ratings Decline, 
SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.sportingnews.com/nascar-news/4517344-nascar-tv-
coverage-network-contract-fox-sports-1-nbc-deal-ratings. 
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NASCAR has gone to great lengths to protect drivers, fans, and the sport in 
general.  These changes have included the size, power, and structure of cars; 
catch fences to prevent debris from entering the stands; window nets to  
prevent things from entering the cockpit; and, roof flaps to prevent the cars 
from getting airborne.  Yet, not all injuries can be prevented.40 
With all this money flowing into the sport, NASCAR saw numerous  
owners try to join the cause.  With the overall number of owners and teams, 
NASCAR had even more growth, although some of it could not be sustained.  
Therefore, teams required more viability and equity in their individual cars to 
make the long-term success of the team, and the sport, more likely.  As a  
result, NASCAR and the race teams created a new ownership structure.  
 C.  Pre-Charter Ownership Structure 
NASCAR’s ownership structure had been substantially the same from its 
inception until 2016, with minor changes.  Through much of its history,  
owners would supply the car, sponsors, and team to the driver in exchange for 
his service.  Early in NASCAR history, many drivers owned their own cars, 
but as NASCAR grew, more money was needed to compete in NASCAR, and 
many teams began to rule multiple cars.  This led to less success by single car 
and driver owned teams.41  Multicar team owners like Junior Johnson, Rick 
Hendrick, and Jack Roush found success in the 1980s.42  As multicar teams 
success flourished, more and more teams sprung up in the 1990s.  Joe Gibbs 
Racing, Robert Yates Racing, Dale Earnhardt Incorporated, and Richard  
Childress Racing all had multiple cars in the 1990s.43 
With the success of larger teams, many became so large that smaller teams 
could not compete.  For example, at one time during the 2000s, Jack Roush 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Hinton, supra note 25.  As seen in the death of NASCAR drivers Adam Petty, Kenny Irwin, 
and Dale Earnhardt all in a one-year period.  Fans are not immune, which can be seen as recently as 
2015 when Austin Dillion’s car entered the stands at DIS, and debris injured some fans.  See Holly 
Cain, Dillon Shaken, but OK After Massive Wreck, NASCAR (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/2015/7/5/last-lap-wreck-daytona-austin-dillon-
coke-zero-400.html. 
41. For example, only Alan Kulwicki and Tony Stewart are the only two owner-drivers to have  
won the NASCAR Championship.  See Christopher Leone, Tony Stewart and the Greatest  
Owner/Drivers in NASCAR History, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/983520-tony-stewart-and-the-greatest-ownerdrivers-in-nascar-
history. 
42. Cokley, supra note 13, at 70. 
43. Id. at 72.  See generally supra note 4–5.  Richard Childress Racing had been a single car team 
with Dale Earnhardt for a number of years before adding Mike Skinner as a second team in the late 
1990s. 
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owned five full time Sprint Cup teams.44  NASCAR, wanting to level the  
playing field while also reducing the cost of ownership, restricted the number 
of teams an owner could have to four.45  Many teams maxed out with four 
cars, while many single car teams were also able to foster.46  NASCAR saw a 
variety of teams, but money and resources became a major issue.47  In the late 
2000s and early 2010s, teams began to form “alliances.”48  Essentially, teams 
that had the same manufacturer would create agreements where they would 
share information, resources, and even team members.49  These alliances  
reduced some costs, but long-term financing and equity was still an issue. 
 D. Post-Charter Ownership Structure 
In 2014, NASCAR teams created the Race Team Alliance (RTA).50  The 
RTA’s primary function is “[t]o provide an organization through which its 
members can collectively preserve, promote and grow the sport of stock car 
racing and thereby advance the long term interests of the racing teams.”51  The 
RTA consists of fourteen major NASCAR race teams.52  The first, and to date 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Jamie McMurray, Matt Kenseth, Carl Edwards, Greg Biffle, and David Ragan all drove for 
Roush Racing in 2007.  See 2008 Sprint Cup Team/Driver Chart, JAYSKI, 
http://www.jayski.com/pages/2008teams.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).  
45. This rule came with exceptions.  For example, if a team wanted to develop a driver that  
currently raced in a lower division, NASCAR would grant that team a waiver for a fifth car for up to 
five races.  E.g. Bob Pockrass, Austin Dillon to Make Sprint Cup Debut at Kansas or Phoenix in Mike 
Curb-Owned Car, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.sportingnews.com/nascar-
news/2055404-austin-dillon-to-make-sprint-cup-debut-at-kansas-or-phoenix-in-mike-curb-owned. 
46. See generally Marty Smith, You Think Your Fuel Bill is High? NASCAR Teams in a Budget 
Squeeze, ESPN (Apr. 5, 2008), 
http://espn.go.com/racing/nascar/cup/columns/story?columnist=smith_marty&page=DoorToDoor080
326. 
47. Pat DeCola, RCR Forms Technical Alliance With Circle Sport-Leavine Family Racing, 
NASCAR (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/2016/1/21/richard-
childress-racing-alliance-circle-sport-leavine-family-racing-ty-dillon.html.  See Kenny Bruce, Furni-
ture Row's Move to Toyota Eased by JGR Alliance, NASCAR (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/2016/2/9/furniture-row-racing-manufacturer-
switch-to-toyota-joe-gibbs-racing-alliance.html; Darrell Waltrip, Kevin Harvick, Stewart-Haas Bene-
fit from Hendrick Motorsports Alliance, FOX SPORTS (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.foxsports.com/nascar/story/kevin-harvick-stewart-haas-racing-benefit-from-hendrick-
motorsports-sprint-cup-alliance-031815. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. 
50. Who We Are, RACE TEAM ALLIANCE, http://raceteamalliance.com/#5 (last visited Dec. 14, 
2017). 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
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major, objective of the RTA was to create long-term equity in race teams.53  
NASCAR listened, and in 2016 NASCAR created the current charter system.54 
The charter system created a “charter” for each team.  The charter  
guarantees a starting position for each points paying event.55  NASCAR  
granted thirty-six charters at the start of the 2016 season.56  The thirty-six 
teams selected charters based upon their attempts to qualify for every event in 
the prior three years.57  Prior to 2016, forty-three cars could enter an event; 
that number has been reduced to forty.58  The first charters issued are for nine 
years.59  The charter system creates a minimum performance standard whereby 
if a team finishes in the bottom three in owners’ points in three consecutive 
years, their charter may be revoked.60  Charters may be leased to another team 
once every five years for one full season. 61 
Likely the biggest outcome from the new system is that charters may be 
sold on the open market.62  For example, MWR was awarded two charters, but 
without an operation, the charters were not necessary.63  As a result, MWR 
chose to sell its charters to other teams.64  Both Stewart-Haas Racing and Joe 
Gibbs Racing had four cars but three charters; both teams acquired their fourth 
charter from MWR.65  Although the price of the charters was not released, 
many in NASCAR have speculated the selling price of a charter is in the range 
of $5 million to $10 million.66 
By creating the charter system, NASCAR has created a guaranteed  
starting position in each race.  The value of a starting spot in race winnings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53. Id.  See Tom Jensen, Rick Hendrick Says Race Team Alliance, NASCAR Deal Could Be Near, 
FOX SPORTS (Sep. 8, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/nascar/story/race-team-alliance-rta-rick-
hendrick-rob-kauffman-brian-france-sprint-cup-franchise-090815. 
54. Fast Facts for NACAR’S Team Owner Charter System, supra note 4. 
55. Id.  Currently there are 36 points paying events.  
56. See NASCAR’s 36 Charter Teams, NASCAR, Feb. 9, 2016, 
http://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/2016/2/9/nascar-36-charter-teams-list.html. 
57. Id. 
58. Fast Facts for NASCAR’s Team Owner Charter System, supra note 4. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Chris Smith, NASCAR's Most Valuable Teams Grow Even Richer with New Charter System, 
FORBES, Feb. 17, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2016/02/17/nascars-most-valuable-
teams-grow-even-richer-with-new-charter-system/#193cc6b31ec8. 
64. Id.  
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
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and sponsorships is astronomical.  A charter’s advantage is that it creates  
equity in every team granted a charter.  The disadvantage, it creates equity  
only in teams with a charter.  Some teams are not guaranteed a starting spot, 
race winnings and sponsorships, and some teams are not members of the RTA 
and were not as involved in the negotiating process. Therefore, some teams are 
inherently precluded from the benefits afforded to others.  
The awarded charters, although awarded merit based, restrict some teams 
from competing in the sport altogether.  Additionally, the field has less cars 
competing than years prior, leaving only four spots for non-chartered teams to 
compete for.  Non-chartered teams like the Wood Brothers, who left the RTA 
the day after it was not awarded a charter, could bring an antitrust claim 
against NASCAR, the RTA, and its comprising teams, claiming that this new 
charter system is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act. 
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION 1 ANALYSIS 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “Every contract, combination [. . 
.], or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce [. . .] is declared to be  
illegal.”67  When parties act in concert to create an unreasonable restraint on 
trade, their actions are considered a violation of Section 1.  For example, when 
two parties agree on a pricing structure, the two parties have collectively 
agreed to change the price to something other than what the free market would 
dictate the price to be. Interference in a market will lead to an analysis of the 
restraint to determine if the restraint is reasonable.  
Courts will either apply the per se rule or the rule of reason when  
analyzing Section 1 claims.  A violation is a per se violation when the action 
by the parties is so egregiously anticompetitive that analysis does not need to 
look into the facts of the case.68  The per se test is applied when it is clear, on 
its face, that a violation is blatantly illegal, typically in situations such as price 
fixing.69  The charter system here does not violate Section 1 so blatantly that it 
will be analyzed under the per se rule analysis.  Therefore, a court will go 
through the rule of reason analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (LexisNexis 2017). 
68. Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the Sherman Act, 30 CAP. U.L. 
REV. 125, 129 (2002) (citing Jay Dratler, Jr., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.02 
(2001)). 
69. Id.   
HELSEL	  28.1	  FINAL.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   12/18/17	  	  3:30	  PM	  
244 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:1 
A.  The Rule of Reason Test 
Under the rule of reason, a court looks at multiple factors when  
determining if a restraint is unreasonable.70  First, each party must act in  
concert.71  Second, the parties acting in concert must affect competition a  
particular market.72  Third, the procompetitive effects of the restraint must 
outweigh the negative effects from the restraint.73  The third prong goes 
through a burden shifting analysis.74  The burden originally falls upon the 
plaintiff to show the anticompetitive effects.75  If the plaintiff does so, the  
burden then shifts to the defendant to show the procompetitive justifications.76  
If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show a less 
restrictive means exists to create the benefits.77  If the burden is not met at 
each step of the analysis, the analysis stops.78  At the conclusion of the burden 
shifting, a court will balance the net positive and negative effects to determine 
if the restraint is a violation of Section 1.79 
Courts have also created a “quick look” analysis that does not fully  
evaluate the effects of the restraint.80  This analysis first requires the defendant 
to illustrate the anticompetitive effects with the burden then shifting to the  
defendant to show the procompetitive justifications.81  This test likely does not 
apply here because the restraint must have a basic, easily identifiable,  
economic impact that is not illegal per se.82  NASCAR’s charter system is  
intricate enough to require further analysis. 
 B. Single Entity Defense 
NASCAR may try to exempt itself from Section 1 analysis by claiming the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70. Id. at 130. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Anderson, supra note 68, at 130. 
75. Id. 
76. Id.   
77. Id.  
78. Id. 
79. Id.   
80. Anderson, supra note 68, at 130–31. 
81. Id. at 131. 
82. Id.  
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single entity defense.  Section 1’s function is to prevent “concerted action.”83  
A single entity exists when separately incorporated companies act with  
unilateral behavior while being wholly owned by the same parent company, 
and are not within the grasp of Section 1.84  The Supreme Court did not intend 
to punish a corporation for choosing one corporate form over another, but did 
state that a separately incorporated firm must still be a wholly owned  
subsidiary of the parent corporation to claim the defense.85  When two  
corporations who are owned together act unilaterally, they are not conspiring 
to defraud the public, but are working towards the same corporate goal.86  
Therefore, under Copperweld, a corporation may be a completely separate, yet 
wholly owned, subsidiary to satisfy the single entity defense.  
Courts have also interpreted Copperweld to create a “unity-of-interests” 
test.87  A unity of interest exists when a corporate parent does not have strong 
ownership in the subsidiary, but the parent has strong corporate control and the 
subsidiary is “interdependent” of the parent.88  An example provided by  
Modric is Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada.89  In Williams, a defendant had a 
contractual agreement not to move to another Jack-In-The-Box management 
position for six months after termination of employment at the first  
Jack-In-The-Box.90 Because Jack-In-The-Box franchises are independently  
incorporated but have a unity of interests, the court held that the single entity 
defense applied.91 
The Supreme Court most recently visited the single entity defense in  
professional sports in American Needle v. NFL.92  In American Needle, the 
Court held that NFL properties, the licensor of all intellectual property rights 
for NFL teams, and each NFL team, was not a single entity under Section 1.93  
The Court stated that each NFL team is a unique corporate actor that is wholly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1984). 
84. Id. at 768. 
85. Id. at 766–67.  See Natasha G. Menell, The Copperweld Question: Drawing the Line Between 
Corporate Family and Cartel, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 467, 478–79 (2016). 
86. Menell, supra note 85, at 478. 
87. Id. at 480. 
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 481.  See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1993). 
90. Williams, 999 F.2d at 447 (citing Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (D. 
Nev. 1992)). 
91. Id.  
92. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
93. Id. at 196. 
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separate in its actions and ownership.94  This is because each team still sells 
their individual merchandise and competes with other NFL teams to do so.95  
Therefore, Section 1 of the Sherman Act applied.96 
NASCAR has not gone through a single entity defense analysis in a court 
of law.  NASCAR’s ability to settle most cases before they go to trial avoids 
this analysis.97  Some have argued that NASCAR is not a single entity because 
its general structure is the same as other major professional sports leagues.98  
This argument focuses on NASCAR’s President operating much like the 
Commissioner of a professional league, and the professional league’s teams 
operating similarly to NASCAR race teams.99  The teams may agree to  
compete against each other in both scenarios, but NASCAR teams not only 
compete against other teams on the track, but off because of the need for  
sponsors, drivers, and teams/equipment.100 
In terms of the charter system and NASCAR, the single entity defense 
does not apply.  The corporate parents (NASCAR) do not wholly own teams, 
nor do they share a unity of interests, much like American Needle.101   
Although an entwinement of economic interests exists, NASCAR, a separate 
corporate entity, issued the charters to team owners, separate corporate  
entities.   Therefore, the actions were concerted between two wholly separate 
corporations and the single entity defense does not apply. 
IV. ANTITRUST LAW, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, AND CASE COMPARISONS 
Because Section 1 applies, case law from other professional sports  
organizations will give a better understanding on how courts will interpret the 
NASCAR charter system.  Courts generally go through the rule of reason 
analysis when analyzing two similarly instituted league decisions: (1)  
franchise ownership and location; and (2) membership and eligibility.  Like 
charters, the league awards a franchise to a specific ownership group.  Each 
league has rules based on franchise ownership and location.102  The league, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94. Id. at 196–97. 
95. Id. at 197. 
96. Id. at 200. 
97. E.g. In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (antitrust 
litigation regarding merchandise sales, settled before trial). 
98. Modric, supra note 27, at 173. 
99. Id.  
100. Id.  
101. See American Needle, 560 U.S. at 183. 
102. See Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports 
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vote of the member franchises, creates these requirements.103  Furthermore, the 
leagues, through the member franchises, vote on relocation of franchises.104  
This has been the subject of much antitrust litigation.  Courts have also looked 
at collaborative decisions in leagues such as collectively licensed intellectual 
property rights.  Additionally, non-team sports, such as tennis and golf, have 
their membership requirements set by the league.  The league, by making  
these decisions, creates antitrust issues much like NASCAR with its creation 
of the charter system.  
A. National Football League  
The National Football League (NFL) has gone through substantial  
antitrust litigation.  Most pointed were the battles of Oakland Raiders Owner 
Al Davis.  In Raiders I, Davis sued the NFL after a league vote denied him the 
right to move to Los Angeles, where the Rams already played.105  The Raiders 
claimed that the NFL and its member franchises violated Section 1 by  
preventing the move of the Raiders from Oakland to Los Angeles.106  The 
Court held that the restraint violated Section 1 because a jury had concluded 
that the evidence submitted supported a balance in favor of the Raiders.107  
The court considered factors such as geographic scope of competition,  
reasonable substitutes in the area, financial viability, and competitive  
balance.108  The factors, weighed by the jury and affirmed by the Ninth  
Circuit, held the restraint to be unreasonable.109  
The most prominent antitrust lawsuit involving the NFL is American  
Needle v. NFL.110   Beyond the single entity defense, American Needle held 
that the rule of reason should apply to teams and professional sports  
organizations.111  As stated above, American Needle, Inc. claimed the NFL  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Franchise Relocation Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 255–57 (2000) (which discusses NFL 
league rules on franchise location).  
103. Id.  
104. Id. 
105. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385–86 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
106. Id. at 1386. 
107. Id. at 1396. 
108. Id. at 1392–95. 
109. Id. at 1396.  See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat'l Football League, 791 F.2d 
1356 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Raiders II”) (holding that although the Raiders were successful in getting the 
move approved, the Raiders failed to show any damages by failing to move immediately). 
110. American Needle, 560 U.S. at 183. 
111. Id. at 203–04. 
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violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with teams by requiring 
them to license all team merchandise through the National Football League 
Properties (NFLP).112  American Needle, who was the beneficiary of this  
license for many years, brought suit after the NFL licensed all properties  
exclusively with Reebok.113  The Court held that the merchandising scheme 
was a violation of Section 1.114  The court reasoned that even though teams 
may share a common economic interest, the teams are not a single entity and 
are therefore acting in concert.115  The Supreme Court, overturning the  
Seventh Circuit, remanded the case so the rule of reason may be applied to the 
restraint.116  
American Needle drastically altered Section 1 application to professional 
sports leagues.  Most importantly, American Needle held that the single entity 
defense did not apply to professional sports teams licensing property rights 
collectively.  Additionally, American Needle held that the rule of reason  
applies when teams create agreements between themselves and the  
professional sports organization.117 
B. Major League Soccer 
Major League Soccer (MLS) has the most distinct ownership structure of 
any North American professional sports organization.  MLS retains ownership 
of each franchise and assigns “operator/investors” to manage each individual 
franchise.118  Each operator/investor then gets a portion of the profits because 
they invested in the franchise, but they would not outright own the  
franchise.119  This ownership structure was challenged in Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer.120  In Fraser, the Court determined that the MLS’s ownership 
structure was unique to antitrust Section 1 litigation.121  Although similar to 
other sports franchises, in that the franchises still competed both on the field 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112. Id. at 187–88. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. at. 204.  
115. Id. at 201. 
116. American Needle, 560 U.S. at 201.  
117. Id. 
118. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2002). 
119. Id.  Owners receive one-half of local ticket sales and concessions, the first $1,125,000 of 
broadcast revenue that increased by a percentage each year, all overseas revenue, and one-half of 
MLS Championship Game revenue and exhibition games.  
120. Id. at 55.  
121. Id. at 60. 
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and in the market place, the franchises were all still owned by MLS.122   
Therefore, the First Circuit held that the MLS and its franchises were a single 
entity because of each party’s economic interests.123  Yet, the court did not  
determine if the MLS and its franchises would be exempt from Section 1  
because of the single entity defense.124  The court held that the single entity 
defense and the rule of reason would lead to the same result, and the difference 
did not matter.125  The crux of Fraser, in respect to the rule of reason, is that 
MLS has to compete against other North American soccer organizations; and 
more importantly, MLS has to compete with far better known and resourced 
international soccer organizations.126  Therefore, the procompetitive  
justifications offered by MLS would not have changed the holding of the court 
and the broader control of the MLS on player contracts does not tip the  
balance back to the players.127 
On at least one other occasion a court has stated that Section 1 applies to 
MLS.128  Although a district court case, the Court held that the MLS has acted 
in concert sufficient enough to survive a summary judgment motion.129 
C. Non-Team Sports 
Non-team sports have a more similar application to NASCAR’s charter 
system. NASCAR teams, although owners may own multiple cars, operate 
much like individual athletes.  Each team, like each athlete, is granted a  
charter to compete in the sport.  Further, NASCAR grants each charter to 
compete in NASCAR sanctioned events; similar to non-team sports  
organizations allowing individuals to compete in tournaments/events.  Golf 
and tennis are two prime examples.  Both sports host tournaments that set 
standards for eligibility to compete in these events.  
1. Professional Golfers Association 
The Professional Golfers Association (PGA) has eligibility requirements 
to compete in most events.  In Deesen v. Professional Golfers Association the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122. Id. at 56. 
123. Id. at 60. 
124. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 60.  
125. Id. at 60–61. 
126. Id. at 59, 62. 
127. Id. at 61–62. 
128. ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
129. Id. 
HELSEL	  28.1	  FINAL.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   12/18/17	  	  3:30	  PM	  
250 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:1 
Ninth Circuit held that Section 1 applies to the PGA in hosting these events.130  
In Deesen, a professional golfer challenged the PGA’s decision to terminate 
his contract and make him ineligible for tournaments.131  A committee  
assembled by the PGA made the decision.132  The Court held that Section 1 
analysis applied, and that the PGA was justified in terminating Deesen’s  
contract.133  The Court reasoned that the PGA’s actions were not unreasonable 
because the standard “insure[d] that professional golf tournaments are not 
bogged down with great numbers of players of inferior ability.134  The purpose 
is thus not to destroy competition but to foster it by maintaining a high quality 
of competition.”135  Therefore, the PGA’s eligibility and competition  
requirements do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  
Since Deesen, a 1966 decision, other courts have revisited Section 1’s  
application to the PGA.  In Toscano v. Professional Golfers Association, the 
court held that the PGA contracting with individual sponsors is not a Section 1 
violation.136  The contracts included an agreement to use PGA rules, which 
prohibit non-PGA events (including Senior Tour events).137  The Court held 
that the contracts, which were negotiated between sponsors and the PGA, were 
not concerted action under Section 1 because the PGA set the terms and the 
sponsors agreed to them.138  
2. Association of Tennis Professionals 
The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) had their current “tiered” 
system challenged under Section 1 in Deutsher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, 
Inc.139  In Deutscher, a German tennis tournament challenged the “Brave New 
World” tiered tennis structure, which put emphasis on more prestigious events 
while limiting smaller tournaments.140  Under this system, the German tennis 
tournament was downgraded from the first tier to the second tier.141  The Third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). 
131. Id. at 168. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 169–70. 
134. Id. at 170. 
135. Id. at 170. 
136. 258 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2001). 
137. Id. at 981–82. 
138. Id. at 985. 
139. 610 F.3d 820 (3rd Cir. 2010).  
140. Id. at 825. 
141. Id. at 826–27. 
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Circuit held that the tiered program does not violation Section 1 of the  
Sherman Act.142  The ATP provided procompetitive justifications in defense of 
the program, including more competitive tournaments, an entertaining product, 
new investments due to a calendar change, higher payments to players, and 
expanded geographic scope.143  Under the rule of reason, the Court concluded 
that a relevant market had also not been established because the German tennis 
tournament did not prove by “[a] preponderance of the evidence the existence 
of a relevant product market within a relevant geographic market.”144   
Therefore, the further analysis of Section 1 was not necessary.145 
D. NASCAR’s Previous Case Law 
NASCAR has been involved in litigation throughout its history.  The  
primary litigation has focused on track selection and race location in 
NASCAR.146 NASCAR is a corporation primarily owned by the France  
family.147  The France family also owns International Speedway Corporation 
(ISC).148  ISC currently owns thirteen tracks, twelve of which are on the 
NASCAR schedule.149  Eight of the twelve have two races, meaning ISC hosts 
twenty of NASCAR’s thirty-six sanctioned events.150  This led to Kentucky 
Speedway suing NASCAR for a race date in 2009.151  NASCAR was  
successful in its Section 1 defense.152  NASCAR’s success hinged on the lack 
of evidence illustrating concerted or colluded action by NASCAR and ISC.153  
NASCAR and Kentucky Speedway eventually agreed upon a race date, which 
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146. See Meri J. Van Blarcom-Gupko, Should NASCAR Be Allowed to Choose the Tracks at 
Which It’s Series Races Are Run?, 16 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 193, 200–202 (2006). 
147. Id. at 201. 
148. Board of Directors, INTERNATIONAL SPEEDWAY CORP., 
http://www.internationalspeedwaycorporation.com/The-Team/Board-of-Directors.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2017). 
149. Our Facilities, INTERNATIONAL SPEEDWAY CORP., 
http://www.internationalspeedwaycorporation.com/What-We-Do/Speedway-Management.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
150. Id.  
151. Ky Speedway v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, 588 F.3d 908, 908–11 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
152. Id. at 920–921. 
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was a disaster in its first year due to parking and traffic, but since has become 
a success.154 
NASCAR has also done its best to avoid antitrust litigation.  For example, 
NASCAR has settled litigation for merchandise antitrust claims,155 used  
standing to defeat challenges to sponsorship limitations,156 and successfully 
argued its limited involvement in tires used at a racetrack to avoid Section 1 
analysis.157  
V. NASCAR’S CHARTER SYSTEM’S BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE RESTRAINTS 
NASCAR’s charter system would go through the full rule of reason  
analysis.  This is because the charter is not egregiously anticompetitive on its 
face.  For a full rule of reason analysis to occur, NASCAR would have to set a 
predetermined price for all teams to pay to purchase a charter agreed upon  
unilaterally by teams that were granted a charter.158  A court, in application of 
the rule of reason, will determine that the charter system is not a violation of 
Section 1.  
A. Concerted Action 
A court will first determine if the actions in creating the charter system  
between NASCAR and team owners is concerted action.159  For an action to be 
concerted, it must be the actions of “individual [actors]” acting together.160  A 
court will look at the actions of the parties involved to determine if the  
individual actors came together to make a decision.  Here, as discussed in the 
single entity defense section, NASCAR and each race team are an individual 
and independent corporation.  Although these corporations may share some 
similar interests, the corporations are direct competitors both on the track and 
off it.  Each team competes for drivers, teams, sponsors, and research and  
development.  Therefore, the single economic corporations of NASCAR and 
each race team acting together is concerted action.161 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154. Terry Blount, Kentucky Speedway Gets a Mulligan, ESPN (July 12, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/rpm/nascar/cup/columns/story?columnist=blount_terry&id=6759250. 
155. See In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 154 (N.D. Ga. 2001). 
156. See AT&T Mobility v. NASCAR, 494 F.3d 1356, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007). 
157. See M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 974 (1st Cir. 1984). 
158. This alone may not even meet the per se standard. 
159. Anderson, supra note 68, at 128. 
160. American Needle, 560 U.S. at 191 (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353 
(1967)). 
161. Cf id. at 197. 
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B. Interstate Trade or Commerce 
A court will then determine if the actor’s restraint affects interstate  
commerce.162  Here, NASCAR’s charter system directly decides who may 
compete in the Sprint Cup Series.  NASCAR green lights specific race teams 
while it waves the caution on others, in that it does not guarantee a starting  
position for their race team.  This prevents certain teams from race winnings, 
sponsorship revenues, and other commerce such as salary to employees of race 
teams and purchasing of racing resources.  Race teams, sponsors, and  
employees are associated with multiple states, whether the race team be  
incorporated in one state and the sponsor in another, or the race winnings be 
collected from another state. NASCAR’s charter system directly influences 
interstate commerce. 
C. Rule of Reason 
Finally, a court will then go through the balancing test of the rule of  
reason analysis to determine if a restraint is unreasonable.163  First, the plaintiff 
must prove the negative effects of a restraint.164  Here, a challenger to the  
charter system could argue multiple things.  One could argue that the charter 
system prevents teams that would otherwise be able to compete from  
competing.  The charter system’s guarantee could push sponsors to teams who 
have charters—typically the already larger and better funded teams—and 
away from the smaller already underfunded teams without a charter.  Sponsors 
may not even want to put their brand on a car at all.  Additionally, a team such 
as the Wood Brothers may argue that if offered an opportunity to purchase a 
charter, the team would have done so.  By preventing the Wood Brothers from 
purchasing a charter, and awarding charters based on a standard NASCAR  
itself created, it could be argued that NASCAR and other team owners  
prevented certain teams from the benefits of a charter. 
Second, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the  
procompetitive justifications for the restraint.165  Here, NASCAR would argue 
that the charter system creates economic stability, competitive balance, and a 
financial future even for defunct teams.  Charters guarantee a starting position 
to full-time teams who have shown a record of long standing racing in 
NASCAR.  By also guaranteeing the starting position and a higher likelihood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162. Anderson, supra note 68, at 128.  
163. Id. at 129–30. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
HELSEL	  28.1	  FINAL.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   12/18/17	  	  3:30	  PM	  
254 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:1 
of sponsorship, a charter would keep teams financial viable.  Additionally, 
more sponsorship would lead to long-term success of race teams in NASCAR.  
Race teams who no longer race in NASCAR would also be allowed to lease 
and/or sell a charter to another race team, thereby creating more equity into a 
race team. 
Third, the burden would then shift back to a plaintiff to prove a lesser  
alternative means than the restraint.166  Here is likely where the balance would 
tip to NASCAR’s favor.  A plaintiff could argue that the prior system created 
value in a race team due to the tangible property a team owns (for example, 
cars, parts, and tools).  Charters have been valued in the millions,167 and the 
equity in a race team without a charter is substantially less.  A plaintiff could 
also argue that NASCAR could grant charters to each team competing  
full-time, which is decided at the beginning of a season.  Unfortunately, this 
substantially reduces the value of a charter. 
Fourth, a court would then balance the prior three factors to determine if a 
restraint is unreasonable.168  Here, NASCAR’s charter systems procompetitive 
effects substantially outweigh any negative impact of the restraint.  Each team 
with a charter has become substantially more valuable.  Additionally, 
NASCAR has created fail-safes.  Teams without a charter can still compete in 
NASCAR, with four open positions available in each race.  Furthermore, 
teams who do not have a charter but make the playoffs are guaranteed a  
starting position in the championship race if they make a deep playoff run.  
Therefore, antitrust law applies to NASCAR’s charter system, and through the 
rule of reason analysis, a court is likely to find that the new charter system is 
not an unreasonable restraint on commerce. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
NASCAR started as a small sanctioning body for southern stock car  
racing.  Over time, the sport grew into a nationally raced, nationally televised, 
and nationally sponsored enterprise.  With the mass growth, money poured  
into the sport faster than gas into a fuel tank.  When money is up for grabs, 
everyone wants a piece.  NASCAR teams, sponsors, and drivers all enjoyed 
the massive expansion that took place throughout the first fifty years of the 
sport.  The auto industry collapse followed quickly by the economic recession 
contracted NASCAR’s growth, which has seen stagnant television viewership 
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and sponsorship struggles throughout the past ten years.  As such, teams,  
fearing the worst, approached NASCAR through the RTA and asked for more 
money.  In turn NASCAR created a chartering system, where thirty-six teams 
qualify for each event.  The charter creates millions of dollars in equity in a 
NASCAR team. 
The problem with guaranteeing a starting position for some is that 
NASCAR did not guarantee a starting position for others.  This raises an  
antitrust Section 1 issue, where NASCAR, in concert with race teams, created 
an economic restraint.  Certain teams would be afforded a charter, an  
economic value in the millions, while other teams were left to forge for  
themselves.  
Comparatively, NASCAR’s charter system is not unprecedented.  The 
NFL has had Section 1 claims against the organization for a multitude of  
reasons. Similar to the charter system, the NFL faced liability, and eventual 
defeat, in franchise relocation cases like Raiders I.  A court will go through a 
rule of reason analysis to determine if the franchise relocation restraint is  
reasonable.  MLS has a franchise structure that is authorized by the league, 
similar to NASCAR, but MLS franchises are still subsidiaries of MLS, and are 
protected by the single entity defense, whereas NASCAR and its race teams 
are not.  Though, even in the MLS challenge, the court said the balance of the 
rule of reason favored the MLS. Non-team sports like golf and tennis have  
also had eligibility restraints. NASCAR’s charter system is similar to an  
eligibility requirement.  Courts have consistently held that tournaments and 
organizations acting together to set competitive requirements is reasonable, 
and therefore not a violation of Section 1.  Even NASCAR itself has gone 
through antitrust litigation, but has done its best to avoid negative judgments. 
A Section 1 claim against NASCAR’s charter system would likely fail.  
Although NASCAR and its race teams acted in concert in interstate  
commerce, the restraint has procompetitive affects that outweigh any net  
negative impact.  A charter creates millions of dollars in equity, attracts  
sustainable sponsors, and levels the playing field between smaller and larger 
teams.  Therefore, the rule of reason analysis of Section 1 tips in NASCAR’s 
favor, and they would end up in victory lane. 
	  
